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Abstract
The theme of this paper is the multiplicity of the consistent sets
emerging in the consistent histories approac to quantum mechanics.
We propose one criterion for choosing preferred families among them:
that the physically realizable quasiclassical domain ought to be one
corresponding to classical histories. We examine the way classical me-
chanics arises as a particular window, and in the important role played
by the canonical group. We finally discuss a possible implication of
our selection criterion: that only a class of Hilbert space operators
correspond to physical quantities and hence the full non-distributivity
of the lattice of quantum propositions is redundant.
The consistent histories approach [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] (or rather ap-
proaches taking into account its diverse existing formulations ) has been a
subject of increasing interest in recent years. It provides a view of time
as an intrinsic object in the quantum theory (particularly appealing when
considering quantum cosmology), a natural language for discussion of the
emergence of classical behaviour and is believed to constitute a converging
point for diverse ideas from different interpretations of quantum theory.
Still it seems that an old problem (or at least a point of unease) of the
Copenhagen interpretation has been transferred into the histories approach:
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the notion of complementarity. The inability according to the Copenhagen
interpretation to assign simultaneously properties to a quantum system that
correspond to non-commuting operators, is translated in the history lan-
guage as the question of the many different “windows to reality” or more
precisely the multitude of maximal consistent sets of histories corresponding
to one decoherence functional. Both are an expression of the non-distributive
character of the lattice of quantum propositions; or equivalently from the
implicit fundamental assumption that all physical observables (and conse-
quently propositions about them) have a counterpart in Hilbert space oper-
ators.
The counter-intuitive ( and rather disturbing ) nature of the attitude to
accept all windows as real has been demonstrated in a series of papers by
Kent [9, 10]. He showed, in particular that a) contradictory propositions
can be inferred with probability one when one is reasoning within different
consistent sets and b) a quasiclassical domain is generically either not sta-
ble in time or does not allow inferences according to the predictions of the
corresponding classical theory. In absence of a precise selection criterion,
the consistent histories theory loses much of its predictive power, since for
instance the quasiclassical limit of the non-relativistic classical mechanics
cannot be uniquely determined. We thus lose sight of the transition “ from
Hilbert space to common sense”.
In this paper we will argue under the assumption that somehow only one
window is physically relevant and realizable , the one corresponding to the
classical world as we experience it. 1 There has been a number of ideas and
conjectures for an algorithm that would enable us to select this particular
window [12, 13], while keeping the established mathematical structures of
the history formalism. I think that we should distinguish two possibilities in
the formulation of such a criterion:
i) introduce an additional postulate (intrinsic in the mathematical structure
of the theory)
ii) specify the physical context of a history theory and identify within this a
mechanism that selects a physical window.
We should elaborate on this point in order to clarify the distinction. His-
tory theory in its current axiomatic form is of a purely logical - statistical
nature. Its primitive concept is the notion of temprorally ordered proposi-
1 This is not the only option , see for instance [11]
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tions, it contains a rule for probability assignement and implication is defined
through conditional probability. It is a universal theory since in no point in
its axiomatics does the need to specify its physical content arise. In this
sense history theory (as any quantum logic scheme) can be viewed as the at-
tempt to capture the general rules, upon which the reasoning about physical
systems should be based. And of course, this raises the question (implicit in
many debates about the completeness of quantum mechanics) whether it is
meaningful to describe the physical world using a context-free abstract lan-
guage. This debate is particularly pronounced here, since the many windows
issue might be taken to imply that not even a concrete representation of the
logic can be sufficient to determine the physical content of a theory.
The difference between the two lines of inquiry should now be clear. Ac-
cording to the first, there would be no reason to abandon the universal, logical
character of the histories axiomatics, while the second admits the necessity
to seek a selection mechanism in the physics of the system.
Proposals of type (i) discussed or implied so far are mainly of a“teleological”
2 type: minimization of some information measure or maximization of some
sharp probability measure defined on sets of consistent histories. I do not
think that a criterion of this type can be eventually succesful. The reason for
this lies in the plethora of consistent sets, many of them being remarkably
trivial. For instance, if one wanted to use minimization of the IL entropy
as a criterion (which is not something the authors of [13] have proposed but
could be a valid conjecture) we would have to contend with histories made
out of spectral projections of the initial density matrix. But even if a crite-
rion nicely avoiding all trivial cases were to be found, we would still have to
cope with the issue of the non-persistence/ non-predictability of the selected
quasiclassical domain. To avoid this one would have to consider sets of his-
tories with temporal support reaching arbitrarily far into the future. This
would entail a highly uncausal prediction algorithm, in direct conflict with
the (cosmological) motivations of a history theory.
If, on the other hand, we look for a universal physical selection mecha-
nism, we should not have to think much, before conjecturing that the ever-
present gravitational field might be somehow relevant. This would be a
history language transcription for Penrose’s idea of gravitationally induced
state vector reduction. Appealing as it might seem, it still has its problems;
2In the sense that minimum entropy or minimum action principles are.
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if a quantum theory of gravity exists and is to be writen in the history lan-
guage, what would be its preferred quasiclassical domain? (Or are we to
consider quantum gravity as the realm of the many coexistent windows?)
The above remarks have set the conceptual ground, upon which the issues
discussed in this paper are to stand. More precisely our aim is as follows: a)
propose a natural minimal condition to be satisfied by a preferred window,
b) examine a concrete case :the emergence of classical mechanics , c) use
the insight obtained by this to strngthen our condition into a sharp selection
criterion. The discussion will suggest the existence of preferred variables in
quantum mechanics. Finally by inverting the argumentation we will be led
to examine the possibility of formulating a history theory with reference only
to those objects. Such a version of history theory, would not need to keep
the full non-distributivity of the lattice of quantum propositions and would
seem to converge to strongly realist interpretational schemes for quantum
mechanics.
We start by stating what the minimum requirement for a selection crite-
rion can be and through the study of their consequences we shall phrase we
shall arrive at a more precise formulation. Our minimum requirement is that
there is a sense according to which the preferred window retains the temporal
structure of the full history theory. More precisely we want the pre3ferred
windowe to correspond to a classical history. 3 By window to reality we
define a maximal subset of the algebra of history propositions, such that any
exhaustive and exclusive set constructed out of its elements is consistent.
Now, this criterion, is an implicit one in Gell-Mann and Hartle’s definition
of a quasiclassical domain as a maximal consistent subalgebra on which ap-
proximately deterministic laws can be defined. Of course this approach is in
conflict with ours, since is meant to identify the nature of the window attuned
to which an intelligent data gathering and computing system can evolve [4],
without doubting the simultaneous validity of the different windows (this has
been discussed extensively in [8])
Now we proceed to state more precisely what is involved in the above
requirement. For this, one needs first to define what we mean by classical
3 This requirement seems to be a type (i) one, for it can be formulated solely in terms
of primitive elemetns of the theory ; its underlying assumption is that there is no sense
in reasoning within windows that do not respect the temporal structure of the full theory.
But we shall see that if it is to give a predictable theory a commitment to the physical
content (though rather slight) should be made
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history theory.
Classical histories
We will prefer to cast the classical histories in the language of classical prob-
ability rather than classical mechanics (CM), for the logical structure of the
latter is a special case of the former.
The primitive element in probability theory is the notion of the sample
space: a measure space X (can be taken as a symplectic manifold in the case
of CM). The space of observables is the commutative algebra O(X) of random
variables i.e measurable functions from X to R (usually taken to satisfy some
suitable condition according to extra structures on X (e.g. smoothness in
the case of CM) A state ω is a positive linear functional on O(X) assigning
to each random variable A its mean value ω(A) ( it corresponds to a positive
element ρω of L
1(X).
A single time proposition corresponds to a measurable subset C ofX ( the
system lies in C at this particular time). The set of all measurable subsets of
X forms a Boolean lattice B(X), which can be concretely represented by the
projective elements of the Banach algebra L∞(X): these are nothing but the
characteristic functions χC(x) of the measurable sets. The association of the
characteristic functions to propossitions about values of random variables is
established through the commutative algebra version of the spectral theorem
F (x) =
∫
λdλχCλ(x) (1)
where F (x) a general element of O(X) and Cλ is the subset of X where F
takes value λ.
It is easy to see how one can translate the constructions of quantum
mechanical histories in this case. An n-time history is essentially a string
of measurable subsets of x: (Ct1 , Ct2 , . . . , Ctn). This is represented by the
projector χC1 ⊗ . . .⊗χCn , which is an element of ⊗nL
∞(X) = L(×nX). The
construction of the space of history propositions then trivially proceeds along
the lines of Isham [6]. 4
In a classical theory there is no obstacle in consistently assigning probabil-
ity measures to all histories. Nevertheless, we will try to write the probability
4 The construction for continuous-time histories should follow similar reasoning: taking
the quantities xt ∈ ×tXt as corresponding to fine grained histories, and constructing
coarse-grainings through the use of a Wiener measure on X .
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assignment through a decoherence functional, to establish contact with the
quantum case. Of course, the interference measured by this will be trivial,
i.e. it will be due only to the non-disjointness of a pair of histories.
Time evolution in a classical probabilistic theory is given by a family
(actually a semigroup) of bistochastic maps 5 Tt : L
∞(X) → L∞(X). These
induce a family of maps T †t on the space of states by (T
†
t ω)(A) = ω(T (A)), in
terms of which a (real-valued) decoherence functional for a pair of histories
α = (C1, . . . , Cn) and α
′ = (C ′1, . . . , C
′
n) with same temporal support, reads
d(α, α′) = Tr
(
χCn(T
†
tn−tn−1(. . . T
†
t2−t1(χC1T
†
t1(ρ0))χC′1) . . .))χC′n
)
(2)
We should distinguish two cases:
i) Deterministic dynamics: T is an automorphism of the algebra of observ-
ables and generically can be defined through a permutation τ on X ( a
canonical transformation for the case of CM): T (A)(x) = τ ∗A(x) = A(τx).
In this case it is trivial to verify that a history can be represented by a
projector on L∞(X), namely
χα = χτ1C1∩τ2C2∩...τnCn (3)
ii) Random dynamics: T is a convex combination of automorphisms: T =∑
i λiτ
∗
i . Using the convexity property of the decoherence functionals [13], it
is easy to establish that expression (3) defines a well behaved decoherence
functional. 6
Finally we choose to define implication through conditional probability.
If α and β are disjoint propositions then we say that α implies β if p(α∪β) =
p(α).
We could then proceed and incorporate the classical history theory as a
special case of the history axiomatics as written down by Isham [6], except
for the fact that not every Boolean lattice is suitable as a space of history
5A linear, positive map T : L∞(X)→ L∞(X) is called bistochastic if T (1) = 1 and its
restriction on L1(X) is trace preserving.
6Incidental to our aims, is the fact that this construction of a decoherence functional
containing random dynamics can be repeated (modulo a few technicalities) in the quantum
mechanical case by making use of the ILS theorem [15]. In particular this implies that
theories of stochastic state vector reduction (like in [16] ) can be nicely incorporated in the
history formalism, and hence suffer from the multiple windows problem. We can therefore
conclude that no modification in the dynamics, is sufficient by itself to provide a selection
criterion.
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propositions. Fundamental for any formulation of probability theory is the
stability of the sample space through time. Hence the lattice of history propo-
sitions should always be identified with the characteristic functions of some
measurable space of the form ×tXt, where the Xt are related by structure-
preserving bijections.
The classical mechanics window
We are now going to examine the sense in which the world of classical me-
chanics arises as a particular window in a quantum mechanical history theory
. The aim is to identify the important structures that eventually give the
corresponding quasiclassical domain and use this information to sharpen our
previous requirements to a selection criterion. We will restrict ourselves to
the case of non-relativistic particle mechanics, since a) for quantum field
theory neither do we have a history version, nor do we have a clear under-
standing of its classical limit, b) we shall rely on the insight obtained by
Omne´s semiclassical theorems [3].
Let us anticipate the discussion to follow and give a useful characterization
for a class of classical histories. Whenever the sample space carries a metric
structure one can define a map ν : B(X) → R+, such that ν(C) gives a
measure of the size and regularity of the cell C (i.e the ratio of the area of its
boundary ∂C to its volume), in such a way that ν(C) is close to zero when
C is sufficiently large and regular. There is a precise sense in which ν can be
constructed; the reader is referred to Omne´s [3] for details. We then call a
classical history theory (×tXt, d, µ) ǫ-deterministic, if for any cell C such that
ν(C) = O(ǫ) there exists another cell C ′ with ν(C ′) = O(ǫ) such that the
conditional probability p(C, t1;C
′, t2|C, t1) is of order O(ǫ). This essentially
means that the randomness of the dynamics is significant only on scales of the
order of the characteristic length of the metric. Two ǫ- deterministic theories
are equivalent if they have isomorphic sample space X and the conditional
probabilities of the two theories differ in the order of ǫ.
Omne´s’ construction starts from the well-known fact that the classical
phase space can be naturally embedded in the projective space of its corre-
sponding Hilbert space by the use of the canonical group. Starting from the
representation of the canonical group on the Hilbert space of the theory, one
can construct the mapping jr from the phase space Γ to the coherent state
projectors z → Pz = U(z)|r〉〈r|U(z)
−1, where |r〉 an arbitrary vector of H .
Hence jr embeds X into PH . The pull-back of the Fubini-Study metric on
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PH defines a metric on X , with respect to which a function ν of the type
discussed above can be constructed. Note, that for a generic group there is
an optimization algorithm [17] for the choice of |r〉, so that the characteristic
scale of the metric on X is essentially h¯. In the case of quantum mechanics
on L2(Rn) this algorithm leads to Gaussian coherent states.
One can then construct approximate projectors corresponding to ”classi-
cal” type of propositions about phase space cells:
PC =
∫
C
dµ(z)Pz (4)
where µ is a measure on X . If ν(C) = O(ǫ) , then any projector in an
ǫ-neighbourhood of Pz can be thought as representing the cell C.
To establish consistency one needs then an important fact: that coherent
states on L2(Rn) are approximately stable under time evolution generated
by Hamiltonians of the form H = p
2
2m
+ V (x) for a large class of physically
interesting potentials V (x). This can be used to establish consistency for all
exclusive and exhaustive sets of histories constructed out of quasiprojectors
corresponding to cells C with small value of ν. 7 We also get approxi-
mate determinism, corresponding to evolution with a classical Hamiltonian
H(z) = Tr(PzH). In this sense the window correponding to classical me-
chanics corresponds to a classical ǫ-deterministic history theory (by no means
a unique one).
7 What Omne´s has actually established is approximate consistency (of order ǫ = ν(C))
of these sets, and assumed that there exist history propositions close to them, out of
which an exact consistent set can be formed. Although this is a plausible assumption,
it still remains to be proved. Let us see what is involved in this proof. Taking two
n-time histories the decoherence functional can be restricted to a continuous map d :
(⊗nB(H)) ⊗ (⊗nB(H)) → C. Consider a set of N history propositions constructed by
approximate projectors Pi, i = 1 . . .N , and assume d(Pi, Pj) < ǫ ( an unsharp approximate
consistency criterion ). Now if one defines the sets Oǫ = d
−1({z ∈ C; |z| < ǫ}) and
C0 = d
−1({0}), it is sufficient to show that the connected component of C0 contained in
the same component of Oǫ with Pi ⊗ Pj has non-empty interior. For then we can use the
fact that the set of projectors is dense in B(H) to associate exact projectors P exactj in as
ǫ-neighbourhood of Pj such that we have exact consistency. This seems to a generic case
for sets of n− time histories in infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces. Of course, when one
assumes continuous time histories the issue becomes more complicated. A study of the
general case would be invaluable towards understanding the ”predictability sieve” on the
possible fine-grainings of a consistent set.
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From the above discussion it is clear that the classical mechanics window
satisfies our previously stated requirement. We are now in a position to
give a more precise characterization : A preferred window such that each
consistent subset of it can be embedded into the lattice of propositions of a
classical history theory. It might be the case that to get uniqueness, we
must impose some condition of maximality on the corresponding classical
history ,so that trivial windows will get excluded. An example is the window
corresponding to propositions about values of energy, any subset of which is
trivially consistent (it seems that one cannot get any contradictory inferences
by considering such a set in conjunction with the CM window). Anyway, if it
turns out to be necessary to include a maximality condition, this can easily
take the form of specifying an extra structure (i.e. the requirement that it is
a topological space or a manifold for the case of CM) for the sample space
X of the emergent (or underlying?) classical history theory.
In our particular case, the window corresponding to classical mechanics
can be shown to be essentially unique. For a different selected window (cor-
responding to a classical history with sample space X ), would imply the
existence of an embedding of X on the projective Hilbert space (or more
generally the existence of a projection-valued measure (PVM) on X . With-
out loss of generality we can take X to be a subspace of Rn, and consider the
marginal PVM corresponding to an one-dimensional submanifold of X . This
defines a self-adjoint operator. Now a fundamental property of the canonical
group is that its spectral projections generate the whole of B(H) and hence
this operator can be represented as f(zˆ) , where zˆ represents the generators
of the canonical group and f some measurable function . This means that
the classical history propositions corresponding to X can be embedded into
the lattice of history propositions of the CM window. 8 It is in this sense
that the CM window (assuming of course that it exists) is maximal. (Note
that in the above argumentation X is assumed to be a manifold). A remark
is in order at this point concerning the role of the hydrodynamic variables
discussed extensively by Gell-Mann and Hartle. Whenever the CM-window
exists, the construction of theses variables proceeds along the lines of classical
8 There are factor ordering ambiguities when choosing f . To make the above arguments
into a rigorous proof one needs to show that observables corresponding to fucntions with
different factor ordering define equivalent ǫ-deterministic thepories. This is quite plausible
for ǫ in the order of h¯ in some power in view of already existent semiclassical theorems ,
but we have been unable to find a general proof
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hydrodynamics, since they can be viewed as further coarse graining on the
emergent classical history theory. More interesting would be the case where
the CM-window does not exist (i.e. the propositions constructed from the
canonical group form no non-trivial consistent sets). In that case it is con-
ceivable that two complementary hydrodynamic windows might exist. This
would of course invalidate our argument that the proposed selection criterion
chooses a unique window. ( It is hard to imagine such a set of variables that
does not reduce to ordinary hydrodynamics or at least to an extension of
irreversible thermodynamics). The physical system where this might be pos-
sible is quantum field theory, where there are indirect arguments [18] (though
definitely not conclusive) that the classical field theory window might not be
emerging for a large class of states of the system.
Preferred window and non-distributivity
From the arguments stated earlier, it should be clear that if we commit our-
selves to the logic of one preferred window, we cannot escape the conclusion
that they are generated by a particular class of Hilbert space operators (the
ones determined by the canonical group). The question then arises: what
is the nature of the other windows ( the ones not stable in time)? They
cannot be considered as anything but redundant, for they are irrelevant to
any physical predictions of the theory. But then, why do they appear at all
in the formalism? The only possible answer is that there is a redundancy
in the primitive elements of the history theory. Not all history propositions
can be considered as physical. This is a point strongly reminiscent of the one
advocated in the context of single-time quantum mechanics by Margenau
and Park [19]: the incomeasurability of observables corresponding to non-
commuting operators can be true in quantum mechanics only if accept as an
axiom that any operator on the Hilbert space corresponds to some physical
observable. The many windows problem is just the history counterpart of
the incomeasurability problem of single-time quantum mechanics; and it is
due to the richest structure of the former that the counterintuitive effects of
such a postulate are most impressive. 9
A consequence of not accepting all operators as physical, is that there
9 Actually one of the strongest arguments posed by Margenau and Park, was the time-
of-flight type of experiments, with an analysis that can be thought as an ancestor of the
history formalism
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is no need to keep the non-distibutive character of the lattice of history
propositions (see [19] for extensive discussion); indeed reasoning inversely,
the non-distibutivity is the main assumption that allows multiple windows.
One should then start thinking of possible substitutes. If one opts for a
distributive lattice structure for history propositions, the first choice would
be to consider Boolean lattices (this is not the only possible choice, see for
instance [20]). Of course, hidden variables theories fall in this category (even
though they would correspond to a classical history theory). Another ap-
proach would be Sorkin’s quantum measure theory, where the lattice of his-
tory propositions is assumed Boolean and the role of the decoherence func-
tional is played bya non-additive measure on this lattice [21].
It turns out that a history theory with a preferred window looks similar
to a Sorkin-type construction. Recall the importance of the canonical group
towards identifying the preferred window. In standard quantum mechan-
ics, its role is also important. Since all infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces
are isomorphic, the only way one can separate the physical content of (say)
L2(R) from L2(R3) is by considering the representations of different canon-
ical groups ( its history version is also very important towards constructing
explicitly the space of history propositions). One is then tempted to the
question? Can one construct a history theory using only “classical” primitive
elements (canonical group or the phase space that can be constructed from it,
possibly plus some additional (complex) structure)? One can for instance as-
sume as primitive elements the paths z(t), z∗(t) on some “phase space” X and
their coarse grainings as given by integration with respect to some Wiener
measure and a coherent-state path-integral version of the decoherence func-
tional between pairs of coarse grained histories α =
∫
Cα
dµ(z(.), z∗(.)) and
α′ =
∫
C′α
dµ(z(.), z∗(.))
d(α, α′) =
∫
dzfdz
∗
fdzidz
∗
i dz
∗
i dz
′
idz
′∗
i e
−z∗
f
zf−z
∗
i zi−z
′∗
i z
′
i
(∫
Cα
dµ(z(.), z∗(.))
∫
Cα′
dµ(z′(.), z′∗(.))eiS[z(.),z
∗(.)]−iS[z′(.),z′∗(.)]
)
ρ(z∗i , z
′
i) (5)
with path integration over paths such that z(0) = zi, z
∗(t) = z∗f , z
′(t) = zf ,
z′∗(0) = z′∗i . Modulo some difference in the probability assignment this
construction is a close relative of Sorkin’s theory.
Unfortunately, this construction is at least incomplete and for a more
fundamental reason than the proverbial non-definability of the path integral
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with Wiener measures: there is no way we can reproduce the quantum me-
chanical combination of subsystems via the tensor product solely from the
knowledge ofX ; we have to introduce a linear structure and hence the Hilbert
space would eventually enter again our schemes.
Before concluding let us summarize the thesis of this paper. I one wishes
for a history theory allowing a) maximum predictability and b) a realist
commitment, the option of seeking a selection algorithm among different
windows is a natural one. Our proposed selection criterion (of temporal
stability of the preferred window) seems to imply that only a class of history
propositions is physically relevant, hence that the non-distributivity of the
lattice of history propositions is redundant. If one then attempts to write
an “economic” version of history theory, where only physical quantities are
taken into account, then one faces one fundamental problem: how would the
Hilbert space structure emerge in such a theory. The problem can be neatly
summarized as the inverse of the many windows problem: How does one
recover the Hilbert space from (distributive) “common sense”?
1 Aknowlegements
I would like to thank A. Kent for an important discussion on this subject
and encouraging me to proceed on that. Also K. Savvidou for insisting that
I read reference [19].
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